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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a secure multibiometric system that
uses deep neural networks and error-correction coding. We
present a feature-level fusion framework to generate a secure
multibiometric template from each user’s multiple biomet-
rics. Two fusion architectures, fully connected architecture
and bilinear architecture, are implemented to develop a ro-
bust multibiometric shared representation. The shared repre-
sentation is used to generate a cancelable biometric template
that involves the selection of a different set of reliable and
discriminative features for each user. This cancelable tem-
plate is a binary vector and is passed through an appropri-
ate error-correcting decoder to find a closest codeword and
this codeword is hashed to generate the final secure template.
The efficacy of the proposed approach is shown using a mul-
timodal database where we achieve state-of-the-art matching
performance, along with cancelability and security.
Index Terms— Multibiometrics, template protection,
Reed-Solomon code, secure-sketch, cancelable biometrics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Multibiometric systems offer several advantages when com-
pared to unibiometric systems, including better recognition
accuracy, security, flexibility, population coverage and user
convenience [1]. However, multibiometric systems have an
increased demand for integrity and privacy because the sys-
tem stores multiple biometric traits of each user.
There has recently been a significant amount of research
in secure biometrics, which can be grouped into two cat-
egories: biometric cryptosystem and transformation based
methods [2]. Fuzzy commitment and secure sketch are biomet-
ric cryptosystem methods and are usually implemented us-
ing error correcting codes and provide information-theoretic
guarantees of security and privacy (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]).
Cancelable biometrics use revocable and non-invertible user-
specific transformations for distorting the enrollment bio-
metric (e.g., [10, 11, 12, 13]), with the matching typically
performed in the transformed domain.
One important issue of a multibiometric secure system is
that biometric traits being combined may not follow the same
feature-level representation, and it is difficult to characterize
multiple biometric traits using compatible feature-level repre-
sentations, as required by a template protection scheme [14].
To counter this issue there have been many fusion techniques
for combining multiple biometrics in the past [15, 1, 14]. One
of the possible techniques is to apply a separate template pro-
tection scheme for each trait followed by decision-level fu-
sion. But such an approach may not be highly secure, since it
is limited by the security of the individual traits.
Motivated by the drawbacks of systems that protect bio-
metric traits separately, we propose in this paper a multi-
biometric secure scheme for face and iris biometrics. This
scheme is based on cancelable biometrics and forward error
control (FEC) codes where the feature extraction for indi-
vidual modalities and joint feature-level fusion are performed
using a Deep Neural Network (DNN). The proposed approach
involves the following steps:
1) The face and iris biometrics are converted into a com-
mon feature space by extracting domain-specific features us-
ing dedicated Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). These
features are then fused with the help of a joint representation
layer (fully connected layer or bilinear layer).
2) The final fused feature vector is reduced in dimension
to generate a multibiometric cancelable template by applying
a feature selection process.
3) The cancelable template is a binary vector that is within
a certain distance from a codeword of an error-correcting
code, which for purposes of illustration we assume is a Reed
Solomon code. By passing the template through an appropri-
ate decoder, the closest codeword is found, and that codeword
is hashed to generate the final secure template.
2. MULTIBIOMETRIC SECURE SCHEME
The block diagram for the proposed framework is shown in
Fig. 1. There are two important blocks for this framework:
Cancelable Template Block (CTB) and Secure Sketch Tem-
plate Block (SSTB) which will be explained in this section.
2.1. Cancelable Template Block (CTB)
The CTB contains the DNN based feature extraction and fu-
sion components followed by the binarizing and reliable bit
extraction stages, which generate a cancelable multibiometric
template. The architecture for the DNN is shown in Fig. 2.
The domain-specific layer of the DNN consists of a CNN for
encoding the face (”Face-CNN”) and a CNN for encoding the
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Fig. 1. Enrollment and Authentication Block Diagram.
iris (”Iris-CNN”). For each CNN, we use VGG-19 [16] pre-
trained on ImageNet [17] as our starting points followed by
fine-tuning on different datasets (section 3.1).
The output feature vectors of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN
are fused in the joint representation layer. We have imple-
mented two different architectures for the joint representation
layer: Fully Connected architecture (FCA) and Bilinear archi-
tecture (BLA). In FCA (Fig.2), the outputs of the Face-CNN
and Iris-CNN are concatenated vertically and passed through
a fully connected layer to fuse the iris and face features. In
BLA, the outputs of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are com-
bined using the matrix outer product of the face and iris fea-
ture vectors. For training the joint representation layer we
adopt a two-step training procedure where we first train only
the joint representation layer greedily with softmax for clas-
sification followed by fine tuning the entire model end-to-end
using back-propagation at a relatively small learning rate.
The output of the joint representation layer is a real val-
ued shared multimodal feature vector for face and iris bio-
metrics. This shared representation vector is binarized and
user-specific reliable bits are extracted using a method that
is similar to the method used by Kevenaar et.al. in [18]. This
user-specific reliable bit vector forms the cancelable template.
Fig. 2. Proposed Deep Neural Network (DNN) Fully Con-
nected Architecture.
2.2. Secure Sketch Template Block (SSTB)
The SSTB contains the forward error correction (FEC) de-
coding stage followed by the hashing stage. The FEC de-
coding implemented in our framework is the equivalent of
the secure-sketch template protection scheme. In the secure-
sketch scheme, error control coding is applied on the bio-
metric feature vector to generate a sketch which is stored as
the template. In our work, the cancelable template gener-
ated from the CTB is considered to be the noisy codeword
of N symbols. This noisy codeword is decoded with a FEC
decoder and the output of the decoder is the multibiometric
sketch sa that corresponds to the codeword closest to the can-
celable template. This multibiometric sketch sa is hashed and
stored in the database. The authentication is also performed
using FEC decoding with the same parameters to give an esti-
mate of the multibiometric sketch sˆa which is hashed and ac-
cess is granted only if the hash matches the enrolled hash. We
have implemented Reed-Solomon (RS) decoder for FEC de-
coding because we can exploit the maximum distance seper-
able (MDS) property of RS codes to manage the intra-class
variability of the joint template.
This error control coding method can be explained in the
context of standard-array decoding. A standard array is a two-
dimensional array where the first row contains the codewords
and every other row is coset of the code, which is found by
adding an unused vector (error pattern) to all the codewords
of the code. Decoding using the standard array is performed
by decoding the received vector r to the codeword at the top
of the column that contains r. The decoding region for a code-
word is the column headed by that codeword. In our frame-
work, the output of the CTB in both enrollment and authen-
tication is considered to be the received vector, which is de-
coded to the codeword at the top of the column. We assume
the enrollment and the probe vector in a genuine authentica-
tion to belong to the same column of the standard array which
implies that they would decode to the same codeword at the
top of the column in which case the hashes would match and
access would be granted. Another important observation is
that the enrollment and probe vector would have a different
error pattern when compared to the codeword at the top of
the column. This observation is important with regard to the
noise included in the biometric during acquisition or process-
ing and makes the system robust. The benefit of our approach
is that we do not have to present any other side information to
the decoder like a syndrome or a saved message key [3, 4].
Our error control coding scheme can also be described
in the context of fuzzy commitment. In fuzzy commitment,
a random message is generated and encoded to give a n-tuple
codeword which is combined (added) with the enrollment fea-
ture vector. The result of this combination is stored as a se-
cure template. During authentication, the probe feature vector
is combined with the stored template and decoded to get the
estimate of the random message which is compared with the
random message used during enrollment for authentication.
In a standard-array context, the random message and its en-
coded codeword belong to the same column of the standard
array. The enrolled biometric template is the coset-leader or
the error pattern and when added to the codeword (of random
message) and the probe, we get a template which when de-
coded gives us the estimate of the random message. For com-
parison purpose, we have also implemented our framework in
the context of a fuzzy commitment scheme using RS codes
and it gives the same result as with a secure sketch scheme.
2.3. Enrollment and Authentication Procedure
The output of the DNN is the joint feature vector e. During
enrollment, G user-specific reliable components are selected
from this vector e and the indices of theseG components form
the user-specific key g . The feature vector e is binarized to
generate a binary vector a. A new user-specific reliable bits
vector ra is formed by selecting the bits from the binary vec-
tor a at the corresponding location or indices as specified by
a key g. Reed-Solomon decoding is applied only on the re-
liable bits vector ra to generate the multibiometric sketch sa.
The hash of this sketch fhash(sa) is stored as a secure template
in the database. The key g is securely stored in a location
that is local to the matcher (i.e., it could be stored in the se-
cure memory of a smartphone, or stored in the cloud if the
matching is performed in the cloud).
During authentication, the probe user presents the biomet-
rics (face and iris) and the key l where l could be same as the
enrollment key g in the case of genuine probe or it could be a
different key for an impostor probe. Using the biometrics and
the key l, the probe reliable bits vector rb is generated and
decoded using a same RS code as in enrollment to generate
an estimate of the enrolled multibiometric sketch sˆa. If the
hash of the enrolled sketch fhash(sa) matches the hash of the
decoded estimate fhash (ˆsa), then the access is granted. In case
hashes do not match, access is denied.
3. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we will dicsuss the datasets and the experimen-
tal results.
3.1. Datasets
The Face-CNN has been fine-tuned on Casia-Webface [19]
which contains 494,414 facial images corresponding to
10,575 subjects. The Iris-CNN has been fine tuned on the
combination of CASIA-Iris-Thousand1 and ND-Iris-0405
[20] with about 84,000 images corresponding to 1355 sub-
jects. The Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are also fine tuned on
the 2013 face and iris subsets of the WVU-Multimodal
2012-2013 datasets2 respectively. The WVU-Multimodal
dataset for the year 2012 and 2013 together contains a total of
1http://biometrics.idealtest.org/
2http://biic.wvu.edu/
119,700 facial images and 257,800 iris images corresponding
to 2263 subjects with 294 common subjects.
3.2. Experimental Set Up and Results
The parameters used for fine-tuning the CNNs are similar to
[16], except that we have used a smaller batch size of 40.
For testing, we have used 50 subjects from WVU-Multimodal
2012 dataset and these 50 subjects have never been used in the
training set. We randomly select 20 face and iris image pairs
with no repetitions for each of these 50 testing subjects. These
1000 pairs (50×20) are forward passed through the DNN and
4096-dimensional 1000 fused feature vectors are extracted.
We then use the binarizing and reliable-bit extraction
method from [18] to generate the cancelable multibiometric
template. The number of reliable components selected from
the fused feature vector depends on the number of bits per
codeword in the RS code. The RS codes use symbols of
length m. The codeword is of length N = 2m−1 in symbols,
which means the number of bits per codeword is n = mN .
For example, if the m = 6 then N = 63 and n = 378. In
this case the number of reliable components chosen would
be 378. This 378-dimensional vector is decoded to generate
a multibiometric sketch whose length equals km bits, where
k can be varied depending on the error correcting capability
required for the code and km also signifies the security of the
system in bits. In our experiments we have taken m = 5, 6, 7,
which means n = 155, 378, 889 respectively.
An important metric to assess the performance of a bio-
metric system is False Accept Rate (FAR) which is defined
as the rate at which the system allows access to an unau-
thorized user. Considering the concept of standard array, it
can be observed that the False Accept Rate (FAR) depends on
the length of the multibiometric sketch k. Cnsider a message
length of k bits, then the standard array has 2k columns (one
for each codeword). Empirically, it has been observed that
due to the binarization process, a impostor template will have
bits that are equally likely to be 0’s and 1’s and therefore they
are equally likely to be in any column of the standard array.
The probability (FAR) that they are in the same column as
the enrollment template is thus 1/(2k) or 2−k. We evaluate
the trade-off between the recognition performance and the se-
curity of the proposed multibiometric protection scheme by
using GAR-Security (G-S) curves. GAR is the Genuine Ac-
cept Rate and is defined as the rate at which the system allows
access to an authorized or a genuine user. The G-S curve is
obtained by varying the error correction capacity or the rate
of the code (varying k for the RS code with symbol size m).
Fig. 3 gives the G-S curves for FCA and BLA for differ-
ent symbol sizem. As we can observe from the plots, for both
FCA and BLA, the best recognition performance is given for
symbol size = 5 or 6 and we can get a GAR of at least 92.5%
for a security of 100 bits. We can also observe from Fig. 3 that
when we use a symbol size of 7 we can still get a good GAR
of above 90% for a security level of 400 bits. Table 1 summa-
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Fig. 3. GAR vs Security curve for FCA (left) and BLA (right) using different symbol sizes.
Symbol Size n Security k/n GAR
(m) (k) FCA BLA
5 155
53 0.34 99.65% 99.85%
80 0.52 98.86% 99.7%
100 0.65 98% 99.68%
6 378
53 0.14 94.55% 99.99%
80 0.21 93% 99.75%
100 0.26 92.5% 99.7%
7 889
53 0.06 79.5% 98.9%
80 0.09 77.5% 98.9%
100 0.11 76.2% 98.5%
Table 1. Genuine Accept Rates of FCA and BLA for a secu-
rity level of 53, 80 and 100 bits using different symbol size.
rizes the GAR of FCA and BLA for different symbol sizes at
a minimum security level of 53 bits, which is equivalent to the
guessing entropy of an 8-character password randomly cho-
sen from a 94-character alphabet [21]. From the table we can
observe that BLA gives much better performance than FCA
architecture for any symbol size.
An important observation here is that the number of reli-
able components chosen from the output of the DNN depends
on the number of bits per codeword n, however, the security
of the system is controlled by the error correcting capability
or the rate of the code. For example, for a symbol size m = 5
and n = 155, to have a security (k) of 100 bits we need to use
a RS code of rate k/n = 100/155 = 0.65.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We can measure the security of a biometric secure scheme in
terms of privacy leakage for various scenarios of data expo-
sure. The privacy leakage is quantified using mutual informa-
tion as I(x;V ) = H(x) − H(x|V ), where V represents the
loss of information and x is the enrolled binary feature vec-
tor. The information can be lost when the key g and/or the
sketch sa is compromised. H(x) quantifies the number of bits
required to specify x and H(x|V ) quantifies the remaining
uncertainty about x given knowledge of V , the mutual infor-
mation I(x;V ) is the reduction in uncertainty about x given
V [2].
The dimension of the binary feature vector is 4096 which
means the uncertainty H(x) = 4096 because the bits of
the binary feature vector are independent and identically
distributed with maximum entropy due to the binarization
process [18]. If the adversary gains access to the key or
the multibiometric sketch or both, the maximum reduction
in uncertainty is given by H(x) − H(x|V ) = 4096 − n as
the adversary has access to at most n components (bits per
codeword) using the key g but not all the components of the
feature vector x. Even if we consider n = 155, it would still
mean an uncertainty of 4096 − 155 = 3941 bits which is
computationally infeasible to crack with brute force attack.
The security analysis shows that the generated multibiometric
sketch is secure as the key is revocable and the error control
coding and hashing provides the non-invertibility.
5. CONCLUSION
The feature extraction capability of deep neural networks has
been utilized to generate a shared joint representation by im-
plementing two different fusion architectures, fully connected
architecture and bilinear architecture. We have utilized the er-
ror correcting capabilities of a Reed-Solomon code to provide
security in the form of a multibiometric sketch. In our ex-
periments, the multibiometric secure scheme has been tested
using Reed Solomon codes of various symbol sizes. Sym-
bol size m=6 gives the best performance with a GAR as high
99.7% for a security of 100 bits, which is computationally
infeasible to crack with brute force. We have shown that
the classification performance can be improved for multiple
modalities while maintaining good security and robustness.
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